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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of utmost good faith (uberrimae fides) is one of the most
important doctrines in insurance law. In its application to assureds, it obliges
proposers of insurance to disclose facts which are material to the risk so as
to enable insurers to make informed decisions on whether or not to resile
from the negotiations or to accept the risks and, if so, at what premiums.
The locus classicus in respect of the test to determine what constitutes a
material fact in Irish insurance law is Chariot Inns Ltd v. Assicurazioni
SPA and Coyle Hamilton Phillips Ltd. In that case the Supreme Court held
that what was to be regarded as material "is a matter of circumstance which
would reasonably influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in deciding
whether he would take the risk and, if so, in determining the premium he
would demand". 1A proposer for insurance is, accordingly, obliged to answer
all material questions asked by an insurer truthfully and honestly and, in
addition, to volunteer material facts which are not made the subject of
specific enquiry. Failure in relation to either requirement will enable the
insurer to avoid the contract. Avoidance of the contract in its entirety is the
only remedy available to the insurer.
As regards the duty to disclose previous criminal information, the law
in Ireland, particularly as it relates to adults, remains unsettled. It is accepted
that convictions of 20 years' standing need not be recounted and that, with
some exceptions, offences committed before a person reaches 18 years of
age will become spent three years after a finding of guilt. In other cases it
seems that a proposer must disclose the fact that a crime has been committed,
but little else can be stated with certainty. In particular, there has been no
judicial evaluation of the need for a direct relationship between the offences
committed and the risk posed, the status of "moral hazard" as it relates to
previous criminal information, the need to disclose charges pending trial
where the proposer is innocent of the charges, and the standing of criminal
information relating to associates of the proposer.
The purpose of this article is to examine the law governing the disclosure
of previous criminal information in Ireland, to highlight features of it that
may produce coercive effects and to suggest avenues of reform. In arguing
for the need for reform, a two-tiered approach will be adopted. In the first
instance, reforms will be suggested which are premised on prevailing law.
l. [1981] IR 225 at 226.
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Such reforms will include the need to impose obligations on insurers to
establish a nexus between the criminal offences committed by the proposer
of insurance and the risk posed, to expand the circumstances in which a
"prudent insurer" determination of materiality will be replaced with a
"reasonable assured" test and to introduce statutory expungement
provisions. Secondly, further support for those reforms will be provided by
drawing upon various contextual and penological arguments. As regards
the contextual avenue of enquiry, it will be argued that the current rules
and remedy that exist in respect of the duty of disclosure are ahistorical
given that they remain closely connected with economic conditions that
existed in the mid-eighteenth century. In the penological context, the article
will seek to demonstrate that the existing rules operate in a manner that is
inconsistent with current more inclusionary policies which are designed to
re-integrate offenders into society and that such rules may contribute to a
process of stigmatisation and continued exclusion. The article will
commence with an analysis of existing rules on the duty to disclose previous
criminal information, particularly as they relate to convictions, charges
pending trial and criminal associates of proposers of insurance.
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
In Aro Road and Land Vehicles v. The Insurance Corporation of Ireland."
a case which would not have reached the courts in England and Wales as a
result of section 4(3)(a) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, the
Irish courts had to consider the doctrine relating to non-disclosure of
previous criminal convictions. In July 1981, the plaintiff company agreed
to sell and deliver goods to a firm in Maize, Co. Antrim. At the request of
the plaintiff, the goods were to be delivered by C.I.E. The goods were to be
transported at the plaintiff's own risk, and it was suggested by the carriers
that the goods be insured. The carriers, acting as agents for the defendant
insurance company, arranged insurance cover. The only information given
to the plaintiff relating to the terms of the insurance was the extent of the
cover; the only information sought by the underwriters was the names and
addresses of the consignor and consignee and the nature and value of the
goods. No opportunity was given to the plaintiff to provide the defendant
with additional information. The goods were to be delivered in four separate
consignments. Three arrived safely, but the fourth was hijacked, set on fire
and destroyed. The plaintiff issued proceedings seeking an indemnity under
the policy for the loss. The defendant sought to repudiate liability on the
basis that the plaintiff company had failed to disclose the fact that the
managing director had been convicted on 10 counts of receiving stolen
motor parts and sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment in 1962.
2. [1986] IR403.
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In the High Court, Carroll J, while personally of the opinion that the
assured's non-disclosure was immaterial, deferred to the expert testimony
which suggested that a reasonable and prudent underwriter would regard
the matter of previous convictions as material and would have regarded its
non-disclosure as a good reason for refusing to underwrite the risk.
Accordingly, the learned judge held that the insurer was entitled to avoid
the policy in question and to repudiate liability. In the Supreme Court, it
was held that the trial judge, as sole and final arbiter, had erred in substituting
the view of an underwriter for her own view in determining the question of
what a reasonable underwriter was entitled to have disclosed: "[i]n disputes
concerning professional competence, a profession is not to be permitted to
be the final arbiter of standards of competence. In the instant case, the
assurance profession is not to be permitted to dictate a binding definition
of what is reasonable.'? Accordingly, the Supreme Court held inter alia
that convictions of almost 20 years standing may remain unrevealed."
The vagueness of approach in this decision, as it relates to the relevance
of criminal information to the formation of insurance contracts, has left
many questions unanswered. What, to begin with, of the need for a nexus
between the offences committed and the risk posed? In England and Wales,
for example, inRoselodge v.Castle' the plaintiff diamond merchants sought
indemnity under an all risks policy from the defendant insurer after the
principal director of the plaintiffs had been robbed of diamonds worth
£304,590. The defendant insurer sought to repudiate liability inter alia on
the grounds that the director had failed to disclose that he had been convicted
of bribing a police officer in 1946, some 18 years prior to entering the
relevant insurance contract, and was fined £75. In respect of this plea of
non-disclosure, McNair J held that it was not established that the director's
offence and conviction "on a matter which has no direct relation to trading
as a diamond merchant" was a material fact which ought to be disclosed."
3. [1986] IR 403 at 442 per McCarthy J. The relevant principle had previously been
stated by Kenny J in Chariot Inns v. Assicurazioni Generali [1981] IR 199 at 225,
a case which was relied on in Aro Road: "[tjhe standard by which materiality is to
be determined is objective and not subjective. In the last resort the matter has to be
determined by the court: the parties to the litigation may call experts in insurance
matters as witnesses to give evidence of what they would have regarded as material,
but the question of materiality is not to be determined by such matters." For the
conclusiveness of expert testimony in Ireland, see D Kelliher, "Expert Evidence In
Ireland" (1996) 14 ILT 42-45. In England and Wales, see also Reynolds and
Anderson v. Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd and Others [1978] 2 L1oyd's Rep 440 at
457-458 per Forbes J.
4. [1986] IR 403 at 414. See also H Ellis, "Disclosure and Good Faith in Insurance
Contracts" (1990) 8 ILT 45.
5. [1966] 2 L1oyd's Rep 113 at 132.
6. However a further plea of non-disclosure, that the plaintiff sales manager had been
convicted eight years previously of smuggling diamonds and jewellery into the
United States, was successful and, accordingly, the defendant insurer was entitled
to avoid the policy.
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If there is no nexus between a conviction for an offence and the risk
posed the question still arises whether the offence, or conviction, would
nevertheless be material if it affects the moral hazard? InEngland and Wales,
some judicial support is evident for the view that a conviction for an offence
unrelated to the risk may be material if it falls under the rubric of moral
hazard.' More recently, support for the broadness of this view has been
circumscribed.' In Reynolds and Anderson v.Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd}
for example, it was held that a conviction for receiving stolen goods was
not material to a fire policy. Forbes J noted:
.,. receiving is always a crime of dishonesty but the professional
receiver is in a different category from someone who may, on one
occasion only, have succumbed to the temptation not to ask the
obvious question about the provenance of some goods offered to
him. In deciding questions of fact and degree such as this it is often
difficult to define with accuracy the precise line of demarcation but
usually comparatively easy to decide whether a given set of
circumstances falls on one side of the line or the other .. .Iconclude
that the defendants [insurers] have failed to prove to my satisfaction
that this particular conviction 11 years previously was a material
fact.
Similarly inDeutsche Ruckversicherung v. Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd., 10
where the plaintiffs sought to avoid a contract for non-disclosure on the
grounds that the defendant's agents acted fraudulently in misappropriating
7. See Clealand v. London General Insurance Co. Ltd (1935) 5 I L ILR 156; Woolcott
v. Sun Alliance and London Insurance Co. Ltd [1978] I WLR 493. See also P.
Clarke, "The Disclosure of Criminal Information to Insurers" (1984) ILMCLQ
100 at 102.
8. The latitude which this argument allowed for is evident in the following passage
from McNair J in Roselodge v. Castle [1966] 2 L1oyd's Rep 113 at 132: "Turning
now to the evidence ofMr Lindley and Mr Archer [underwriters] as to the materiality
of [the assured's] conviction 20 years before, it is true that both these witnesses
stated in plain terms that they would not have written the risk had the fact been
disclo ed; but they were driven in cross-examination to state such extreme views
that I was unable to accept their evidence on this point. It is not necessary to cite
example of their extreme views. But I would mention one. Mr Archer stated that
in his view a man who stole apples at the age of 17 and had lived a blameless life
for 50 years IS so much more likely to steal diamonds at the age of67 that if he had
been told him this when putting forward a proposal at the age of 67, he would not
have insured him. Many other instances of the like character can be cited from the
transcript." Insurers have not been deterred from raising such arguments. Recently
in England and Wales, it was suggested by an underwriter in Inversiones Manria
S.A. v. Sphere Drake Insurance Company Plc (The Dora) [1989] I Lloyd's Rep 69
at 93 that moral hazard was a most important consideration and that "the offence of
smuggling a much as a single bottle of whisky would be material."
9. [1978] 2 L1oyd's Rep 440 at 460-461.
10. [1995] I Lloyd' Rep 153 at 164.
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overriding commissions that should have been credited to the defendant, I I
Philipps J held:
I see the force of the argument that re insurers are likely to be
disinclined to accept risks from brokers or agents who have behaved
dishonestly, but where the dishonest conduct has no impact on the
risks being reinsured, I question whether it can entitle the re insurers
to avoid contracts placed by such brokers or agents on the grounds
of non-disclosure. The doctrine of non-disclosure is founded in
equity. Avoidance in circumstances such as those in this case is liable
to have results that are inequitable.'?
In summary, it is submitted that the assured must disclose an offence, which
involves a level of crirninality which is contrary to standards of honesty
and integrity and which has a direct connection to the risk posed, or, would
by its constitution and temporal closeness (but excluding offences which
fall within the ambit of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974) to the
proposed insurance reveal to an insurer, having regard to the nature of the
risk, the probability of recurring dishonest conduct by the assured. 13
CHARGES PENDING TRIAL
To date, the examination of previous criminal information has only focused
on convictions for criminal offences. What of the need for a proposer of
insurance to disclose charges pending trial and the previous criminal conduct
of his or her associates? In England and Wales, in March Cabaret v. London
Assurance.t" the defendant insurer sought to avoid a fire policy inter alia
on the grounds that the plaintiff assured had failed to disclose that he had
been charged with handling stolen property prior to renewal of the policy.
The assured was committed for trial on June 14, 1969; the policy fell due
for renewal on April 20, 1970. On June 22, 1970, the assured was convicted,
after he pleaded not guilty, and was fined £2,000 and ordered to pay £500
costs. The learned judge, May J, held, on the balance of probabilities, that
the assured had committed the criminal offence alleged and this was a fact
which was necessary to disclose to insurers on the basis that it went to the
moral integrity of the proposer. To the argument that an assured was only
11. The plaintiffs claimed that knowledge of the fraud should be imputed to the
defendant company since the agents in question were the directing mind of that
company.
12. On the difficulties of accepting expert underwriter opinion on moral hazard, see
Insurance Corporation of the Channel Islands and another v. Royal Hotel Limited
and Others [1998] Lloyd's Rep 151.
13. See N. Legh-Jones et ai, eds., MacGillivray on Insurance Law (London, 1997), p.
412.
14. [1975] I L1oyd's Rep 169.
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bound to disclose his arrest and committal for trial in keeping with his right
to silence and privilege against self-incrimination, May J noted:
I was concerned at one stage in this case about how one could
reconcile the presumption of innocence and the privilege of non-
incrimination with the duty of disclosure ... 7\fter argument I realise
that my doubts were based upon a fallacy. One must remember that
there is no estoppel by acquittal save as between the Crown and the
person acquitted. There is nothing to prevent one party to civil
proceedings, if the fact be material and relevant, attempting to prove
that another party to those proceedings has in truth committed the
crime of which that other party has been previously acquitted in a
criminal court ... Thus even if [the assured] had been acquitted prior
to renewal ... there would ... have been nothing to prevent insurers
attempting to prove that he had committed the offence. If they had
succeeded and if [the assured] had, as here, failed to disclose that
he had committed the offences, then this would, notwithstanding
his acquittal, have been a material non-disclosure entitling insurers
to avoid the policy. No one has a right to a contract of insurance,
and if a proposer has committed a criminal offence which is material
and ought to be disclosed he must disclose it, despite the presumption
of innocence which is only a presumption, and despite the privilege
of non-incrimination, which is only a privilege or he must give up
the idea of obtaining insurance at all."
The learned judge went on to suggest: "[t]here is one thing I would like to
add; had it been material I would have been prepared to hold in this case
that in any event. .. [the assured] ought to have disclosed his arrest, charge
and committal for trial at the date of renewal even though in truth he was
15. [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep 169 at 177. See also Insurance Corporation of the Channel
Islands v. Royal Hotel Limited and Others [1998] Lloyd's Rep 151. Abrogating
the right to silence or privilege against self-incrimination through requiring an
insurance proposer in a non-judicial investigation to disclose the committal of
criminal offences, for which he or she has not been tried, raises questions about the
admissibility of any such statement in subsequent criminal proceedings. The
admissibility of such statements will depend on their voluntariness. In Saunders v.
UK (1996) 23 EHRR 313 at 340, which concerned the interpretation of s. 436 of
the Companies Act 1985, in England and Wales, as it applied to Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights
held: "The public interest cannot be invoked to justify the use of answers
compulsorily obtained in a non-judicial investigation to incriminate the accused
during the trial proceedings ... Moreover the fact that such statements were made
by the applicant prior to his being charged does not prevent their later use in criminal
proceedings from constituting an infringement of the right." In Ireland, see Re
National Irish Bank Ltd [1999] 3 IR 190; People (Attorney General) v. Cummins
[1972] IR 312 at 322 per Walsh J.
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innocent.':" In respect of this last submission, that a proposer for insurance
ought to disclose the fact of his arrest, charge and committal for trial at the
date of renewal, even though he was innocent of the charges, Forbes J
stated in Reynolds and Anderson v. Phoenix:
With the greatest respect to Mr Justice May, I must decline to follow
him in this suggestion. The object of requiring disclosure of
circumstances which affect the moral risk is to discover whether the
proposer is a person likely to be an additional risk from the point of
view of insurance. The most relevant circumstance for disclosure is
therefore that he actually committed an offence of a character which
would in fact influence the insurer's judgment. The proposer is bound
to disclose the commission of that offence even though he has been
acquitted or even if no one other than he has the slightest idea that
he committed it: the material circumstance is the commission of the
offence. A conviction for a criminal offence is itself, it seems to me,
also material. ..even though the proposer may protest his innocence
or in fact has not committed the offence; for a responsible insurer is
himself entitled to assume that prima facie the proposer was rightly
convicted and has therefore in fact committed the offence. If therefore
an allegation of a relevant criminal offence is made and the allegation
is true the proposer must disclose it not because the allegation has
been made but because the offence has been committed; it is not
then the allegation which must be disclosed but the underlying fact
that a crime has been committed. 17
In Ireland in Dermot Latham v. Hibernian Insurance Company Ltd and
Peter J Sheridan and Company Limited'" Blayney J approved broadly of
Reynolds and Anderson v. Phoenix Assurance Company Limited and
Others: "[i]n that case [Reynolds and Anderson] it was held that the material
circumstance was not the fact that a party had been charged with an offence,
but that he had committed the offence. What had to be disclosed was the
underlying fact that a crime had been committed." Interestingly, in the
English case of Inversiones Manria S.A. v. Sphere Drake Insurance Co.
Plc (TheDora) ,19 Philipps J submitted obiter that he preferred the reasoning
of May J inMarch to that ofForbes J in Reynolds and, accordingly, charges
of smuggling, whether or not they were well-founded, should have been
disclosed.
Given the broad application of Reynolds in Ireland, it is unclear whether
the proposer for insurance must disclose his or her arrest, charge and
16. [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep 169 at 177.
17. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 440 at 460. For support for Forbes J's position, see the
judgment of Fisher J in the High Court in New Zealand in Gate v. Sun Alliance
Insurance Ltd. [1995] LRLR 385.
18. High Court, March 22, 1991, at p. 7.
19. [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 69 at 93-94.
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committal for trial even if the allegations are unfounded or only if the offence
has been committed. It is submitted that the former proposition casts the
net too widely. Moreover, where England and Wales is concerned, that
proposition is inconsistent with the objective of the Rehabilitation of
Offenders Act 1974: applying such a proposition, a proposer for insurance
could, ex hypothesi, be required to disclose spurious-and baseless allegations
but would be excused from having to disclose a spent conviction "of
comparatively recent date" under the 1974 Act. Accordingly, the latter
proposition is to be preferred." It would seem to follow that the law as it
currently exists requires, or should require, a proposer for insurance to
disclose the facts of an arrest, charge or committal for trial for an offence -
where the offence has been committed - and, it also appears, the commission
of an offence for which the proposer was acquitted or which remains
undetected at the time of proposing the risk.
Two additional matters should be noted. First, disclosure of the facts of
an arrest, charge or committal for trial for an offence, where the offence
has been committed, should only be material if it relates directly to the risk
sought to be insured, or by its nature indicates a strong likelihood of
continuing dishonesty. Second, it is doubtful if the requirement to disclose
offences for which a proposer has been acquitted in criminal proceedings,
or which remain undetected, is of any real deterrent or practical value. To
begin with, the threat of a subsequent civil action by the insurer to prove
the commission of the offence and, consequently, if successful, to avoid
the policy, may not be sufficient to displace the proposer's impulse to conceal
the commission of the offence given that when the duty arises, the offence
still remains undetected or unproven.
More pertinently, it is submitted that while an insurer is not estopped
from pursuing the proposer in civil proceedings to prove that the crime
was committed, the degree of probability required within the preponderance
of probability may be considerable particularly in the light of the purpose
of the action." In other words, the more probable success rate of an insurer
in a civil action, following the assured's acquittal or non-prosecution in a
criminal action, may be more imaginary than real given the essential nature
of the action and the all or nothing nature of the remedy available to the
insurer - avoidance of the insurance contract - if successful. Furthermore,
the proposer cannot be certain in incriminating himself or herself to the
20. But see the dictum of Colman J in The Moonacre [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 501 at 521:
"if the proposer is in possession of information which, if true, would be material to
the risk and he fails to disclose it, the insurer will be entitled to avoid the policy
even if the information in the possession of the assured is subsequently found to
have been completely untrue."
21. See, for example, Halford v. Brookes (1991) The TImes, October 3, where it was
held that allegations of criminal conduct in civil proceedings need to be proved
beyond a mere balance of probabilities. See also Bater v. Bater [1951] P 35 at 37
per Denning LJ; Rv. Milk Marketing Board, ex p Austin (1983) The TImes, March
21; Re a Solicitor [1993] QB 69; RTv. VP (Orse v. T.) [1990] 1 IR 545.
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insurer that any such statement will not be adduced in evidence at a
subsequent criminal action." Finally, should the proposer disclose criminal
wrongdoing to an insurer and the proposed risk is declined (and it invariably
will be), in addition to incriminating himself or herself, the proposer may
also be bound to disclose the fact of the refusal, and/or the reasons for the
refusal, to other insurers.
CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES
Finally, not only are an applicant's own convictions capable of being
construed as material, so too are those of persons with whom he or she
associates - though presumably there should be a nexus between the offences
and the risk insured against or a likelihood of continuing dishonesty as it
relates to that risk. Although there is no authority precisely to this effect,
such a proposition also applies, mutatis mutandis, to other kinds of criminal
information concerning associates of the assured including arrest, charge,
and committal for trial (where well founded) and where the offence has
been committed but which remains undetected or in respect of which the
associate has been acquitted.
In Lambert v. Co-op Insurance Society Limited/? for example, an
assured signed a proposal form for an all risks insurance policy to cover
her own and her husband's jewellery. Though no questions were asked in
the proposal form, the assured failed to disclose that her husband had been
convicted "some years earlier" of receiving stolen goods and fined £25.
She also failed to disclose that four months prior to renewing the policy her
husband was convicted a second time of conspiracy to steal and theft and
was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment. When a claim was made on
the policy, the defendant insurers repudiated liability on the basis that the
assured failed to disclose her husband's previous two convictions. It was
held on appeal that the second conviction" was a material fact which
required disclosure." Similarly, in The Dora'" the plaintiff assured claimed
22. But see supra, n. 15.
23. [1975]2 Lloyd's Rep 485
24. The defendant insurer's branch manager had testified at the trial to the effect that
though his company would have wanted to know of the first conviction, they would
in all probability have issued the policy just the same. If, however, they had known
of the second conviction, they would not have invited renewal of the policy.
25. MacKenna J did however state [1975]2 Lloyd's Rep 485 at 491: "The present case
shows the unsatisfactory state of the law. Mrs Lambert [the assured] is unlikely to
have thought it necessary to disclose the distressing fact of her husband's recent
conviction when she was renewing the policy on her little store of jewellery. She is
not an underwriter and has presumably no experience in these matters. The defendant
company would act decently if, having established the point of principle, they
were to pay her. Itmight be thought a heartless thing if they did not, but that is their
business not mine."
26. [1989] 1Lloyd's Rep 69 at 94-95.
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under a contract of marine insurance in respect of the total loss of a yacht.
The defendant insurers alleged inter alia that the assured failed to disclose
that the manager and skipper of the yacht were facing smuggling charges,
and, that the skipper had a previous criminal record - in the five years prior
to the proposal, he had been convicted seven times under a foreign law of..
drawing cheques against insufficient funds. It was held that the defendant
insurers had made good their right to avoid the contract on the grounds of
non-disclosure in respect of both the smuggling charges and previous
criminal record.
The question of association as it relates to previous criminal information
has never been dealt with by the Irish courts. The opportunity did however
present itself in Latham but Blayney J declined to deliberate on the matter.
As noted, the plaintiff and Oliver Byme obtained a 35 year old lease for a
property in Dublin in May 1983 and opened a 24-hour grocery shop.
Insurance cover was obtained from Hibemian Insurance Company, initially
in the names ofthe plaintiff and Oliver Byme. Before the policy was renewed
in August 1984, it was completed in the plaintiff's own name. The material
facts were that the plaintiff had on November 22, 1983 committed an offence
of receiving stolen goods - and had admitted doing so - which ought to
have been disclosed at renewal. Similarly Oliver Byme had been arrested
and charged with the same offence at the same time as the plaintiff.
Moreover, it was adduced in evidence that even though Oliver Byme was
not a party to the renewal of the insurance policy, he had a private
arrangement with the plaintiff under which he would receive 50 per cent of
any claim which was recovered from the insurer.
Latham was decided on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to disclose
that he had committed the relevant offence and had admitted it. The question
that decision begs, however, is whether or not the plaintiff's association
with Byme, as it related to the property in question, and the fact of the
latter's arrest and charge for the same offence, was also a material fact
which ought to be disclosed. Presumably such a fact would be material
provided there was some form of continued association in respect of the
insured property." As noted, no reference was made to the issue in the
judgment. Indeed the ambiguity of the judgment on the question ofprevious
criminal information is heightened by the fact that Blayney J, in response
to a submission by counsel for the plaintiff that the mere charge and arrest
of the plaintiff was not a material fact which ought to be disclosed, suggested
as follows:
It is not necessary in the circumstances to consider another issue
27. On this point, it should be noted that Oliver Byrne was joined as a plaintiff,
along with Latham, in the claim against the defendant brokers for negligence and
breach of contract. See Dermot Latham v. Hibernian Insurance Company Limited
and Peter J Sheridan and Company Limited, High Court, December 4,1991, per
Blayney J.
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which was raised in the course of the argument, namely, whether
the mere charge and arrest of the plaintiff was a material fact which
ought to have been disclosed. Itwas part of the plaintiff's submission
that it was not. Since it is not necessary to consider the issue I make
no finding in respect of it.28
Given that the learned trial judge approved of Reynolds and Anderson as it
related to the disclosure of the fact of having committed an offence, as
opposed to having been charged with an offence, it would not be difficult
to refine the principle further, in a manner consistent with Reynolds and
Anderson, by suggesting that a charge and arrest would stricti juris be
material if, and only if, the assured knew them to be well-founded.
AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
The law on disclosure of criminal information by adults in Ireland is latently
coercive by virtue of its ambiguity. Beyond the fact that convictions of
approximately 20 years' standing need not be recounted, and that what is
material to disclose is that a crime has been committed, little else can be
expressed with certainty. Within such a broad and potentially oppressive
net there remains a grey area of undetermined issues. These include whether
or not there is a requirement of a nexus between offences committed and
the risk posed (and if so the threshold of proof inrespect of the establishment
of such a nexus); the status of criminal information vis-a-vis the moral
hazard; the circumstances in which a proposer for insurance will be required
to disclose his or her arrest, charge and committal for trial; whether or not
a proposer will be obliged to disclose offences which remain undetected or
for which he or she has been acquitted and the standing of previous criminal
information as it relates to associates of the proposer.
A number of reforms can be suggested. First, given the lack of clear
judicial guidance consideration should be given to a number of matters.
Second, it has been suggested by Hasson - in arguing for a reversion to a
more restrictive and credible reading of the decision in Carter v. Boehm,
the locus classicus in respect of uberrimae fides contracts in insurance
law, than that espoused in later judgments - that where questions about
previous criminal information are not asked in a proposal form insurers
should be taken to have waived their right to this information.i? The
difficulty with this approach, however, is that the current position is that
the presumption that matters dealt with in a proposal form are material is
28. Dermot Latham v. Hibernian Insurance Company Limited and Peter J. Sheridan
and Company Limited, High Court, March 22, 1991 at pp. 9-10.
29. R.A. Hasson, "The Doctrine of Uberrimae Fides in Insurance Law - a critical
evaluation" (1969) 32 MLR 615 at 626
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not matched by a corresponding presumption that matters not so dealt with
are not material. As Scrutton LJ noted in Rozannes v. Bowenr"
As the underwriter knows nothing and the man who comes to him
to insure knows everything, it is the duty of the assured, the man
who desires to the policy, to make full disclosure to the underwriters
without being asked of all the material circumstances; because the
underwriter knows nothing and the assured knows everything.'!
Given the uncritical affirmation by the judiciary of the proposition that the
scope of the duty extends beyond questions asked in the proposal form,"
it is doubtful whether the courts would revert to a narrow interpretation of
Carter." From an Irish perspective, however, the obiter proposition of
McCarthy J in Aro Road holds out a flicker of hope. The learned judge
suggested in his judgment that in circumstances where an insurer does not
ask a question in the proposal form, the materiality emphasis should switch
from a prudent insurer to a reasonable assured test:
In my view, if the judgment of an insurer is such as to require
disclosure of what he thinks is relevant but what a reasonable assured
ifhe thought of it at all, would not think relevant, then, in the absence
of a question directed towards the disclosure of such a fact, the
30. (1928) 32 LlLR 98 at 102.
31. Hasson would argue that this proposition reflects "only very recent judicial doctrine
and not a rule of great antiquity". R.A. Hasson, op. cit., n. 29, p. 616. Moreover, he
would argue more generally: "[t]he doctrine is in error in assessing the strength of
the parties with regard to knowledge. The doctrine assumes that the assured is in a
stronger position than the insurer because ... he has more knowledge than the insurer.
But the possession of greater knowledge, it is submitted, puts the insured in a
weaker position, since he ... does not know which parts of that information the
insurer wishes to have. It is submitted, however, that it is the insurer who should be
seen as the stronger party since he .. .is aware of what information he seeks to have.
As against this, the insured, even under the limited formulations of the doctrine
requiring him to disclose only facts within his knowledge, may well be in a position
of either not knowing, or else being uncertain, as to the materiality of a particular
fact." Ibid., pp. 633-634.
32. In Ireland, see the dictum of Kenny J in the Supreme Court in Chariot Inns v.
Assicuazioni Generali [1981] IR 199 at 225: "[b]ut the correct answering of any
questions asked is not the entire obligation of the person seeking insurance: he is
bound, in addition, to disclose to the insurance company every matter which is
material to the risk against which he is seeking indemnity." See also the dictum of
Henchy J in the Supreme Court in Aro Road and Land Vehicles v. Insurance
Corporation of Ireland [1986] IR 403 at 409.
33. Nonetheless, and given the current ambiguity in Irish law as regards criminal
information, every effort should be made to construe such questions in a proposal
form restrictively. See Revel! v. London General Insurance Company Limited (1934)
50 LlLR 114.
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insurer, albeit prudent, cannot properly be held to be acting
reasonably. 34
Applying this proposition to the issues in hand, if an actual insurer requires
criminal information to be disclosed but there are no specific questions to
this effect in the proposal form, the insurer will be taken to have acted
unreasonably and the prudent insurer test will be replaced by a reasonable
assured test. Though on the facts of this case it is submitted that the reasoning
of Henchy J was more convincing in that he indicated that in over-the-
counter insurance, where there is minimal formal inquiry and little
opportunity for full disclosure to be made of facts which an insurer may ex
post facto deem material, waiver of information will be deemed to have
occurred." it may be possible for the Irish judiciary in the future to rely on
McCarthy J's dictum, in circumstances where waiver has not occurred, to
expand the circumstances in which the test of materiality will be transposed
from a prudent insurer to a reasonable assured's perspective. Though such
reasoning does not explicitly mirror that called for by Hasson it is as close
as is reasonably and credibly possible without puncturing the proposition
that materiality extends beyond questions asked in the proposal form."
Thirdly, there is also a need for the Irish courts to impose an obligation
on insurers who seek to avoid policies for non-disclosure of previous
criminal information to establish a nexus, and/or impact by the moral hazard,
between offences committed and the risk posed. The threshold set for
insurers in this regard should be high. Moreover, a similar nexus and impact
threshold should also be required vis-a-vis the previous criminal information
of an associate of the assured and the term "associate", by definition, should
be construed restrictively given the remedy available to insurers and the
high degree of protection the doctrine affords them. Finally, what is perhaps
most striking about Irish law as regards previous criminal information in
34. [1986] IR 403 at 412.
35. This seems more plausible. Why subject the assured to even a reasonable assured
test as a result of an insurer's conduct, when the duty of disclosure can be
circumscribed by waiver as a consequence of the said conduct thereby ensuring
that the question of materiality, albeit only a reasonable assured one, never arises?
36. See also para. l(c) Irish Insurance Codes of Practice, 1992 (non-life) and para.
l(c) Irish Insurance Codes of Practice, 1992 (life) which provide that on those
matters which insurers have commonly found to be material, clear guidelines should
be asked on the proposal form. Para. 3 (a)(i), (non-life), and para. 3(a)(iii) (life)
also provide that an insurer should not invalidate a policy unless it is a fact which
the proposer could reasonably be expected to disclose. It should be pointed out,
however, that the Insurance Codes of Practice do not have binding legal authority
and only apply to private policyholders. See also Regulation 6(1) of the Life
Assurance (Provision of Information) Regulations 2001 (S.l. No. 15 of 2001),
enacted pursuant to the Insurance Act 1989, as amended by the Insurance Act
2000, which require suppliers of life assurance in Ireland to provide detailed
information to clients about, inter alia, the consequences of failing to disclose
material facts.
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respect of adults is the lack of expungement provisions. This increases the
current ambiguity in the common law. Indeed, every European Union
country, with the exception ofIreland, makes available some form of spent
conviction scheme as regards a person's criminal record.'?
In England and Wales, for example, section 4(3 )(a) of the Rehabilitation..
of Offenders Act 1974 provides that an applicant for insurance is never
bound to disclose a conviction which has become spent under the terms of
the Act.38 This legislation has however been the subject of criticism and is
under review." For example, under the current Act, a sentence of
imprisonment of more than 30 months can never be expunged. Moreover,
section 7(3) of the Act gives the Court a discretion to admit evidence as to
previous criminal convictions which fall within the ambit of the legislation
in circumstances where it is satisfied that "justice cannot be done in the
case except by admitting or requiring evidence relating to a person's spent
convictions't.t" Though the provisions in the UK are currently quite
restrictive, particularly as they relate to sentences of more than 30 months'
imprisonment, reform in Ireland, whether by way of further judicial
incorporation or, more appropriately, by statutory enactment, would benefit
from careful consideration of expected recommendations of the UK review
group. More generally, the expungement provisions in other EU countries,"
as well as common law jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia,
can provide a model for reform. Reform along these lines would alleviate
37. See The National Economic and Social Forum, Re-integration ojPrisoners (Forum
Report No. 22) (Dublin, 2002), p. 91.
38. A term of imprisonment exceeding six months but not exceeding 30 months will
become spent after ten years; a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding six months
will become spent after seven years. These periods are halved in respect of offenders
under the age of 17.
39. See J. Broadhead, "Denying the Past" (2001) 151 NLJ1 566.
40. See also Better Regulation Task Force, Review oj Fit Persons Criteria, (London,
1999), p. 24 where it was suggested that the rehabilitation periods which determine
when certain types of convictions become spent "have arisen more from political
expediency than any rational justification."
41. In Spain, Article 73 of the General Law for the Penitentiary System states that
people who have completed their sentences fully regain their rights as citizens and
that "under no circumstances can criminal records serve as a motive for social or
judicial discrimination". According to Directives issued pursuant to Article 118 of
the Penal Code and in Royal Decree 2012/83 at the Ministry of Justice, criminal
records can be erased after six months for non-serious offences and two years for
serious offences. In circumstances where a prison sentence was imposed three years
must have elapsed and five years must have elapsed for sentences requiring
confinement in a closed regime or high security establishment. See NIACRO,
Regulating the Yellow Ticket: the laws, policies and practices which affect the
employment ojpeople with criminal records in the European Union (Belfast, 1996),
p. 40. In Italy, Article 179 of the Penal Code provides that rehabilitation will be
deemed to have occurred five years after the principal punishment has been
completed. Ibid., p. 39.
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some of the harshness created by the current anomalous state of the law in
this country.f
FURTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REFORM
The purpose of this final section is briefly to touch upon other avenues of
enquiry which relate to the need for reform beyond a strict interpretation of
the uberrimae fides doctrine. It will focus on the collateral repercussions
following an insurer's decision to avoid or refuse a policy of insurance on
the grounds of an individual's previous criminal history which the existing
legal rules on disclosure have the capacity to generate. Such an analysis
will be undertaken by concentrating on a variety of current proposals in
Ireland which are designed to challenge the "multiple disadvantages" that
are often experienced by the criminalised. Itwill be argued that the current
rules on disclosure are at variance with these proposals given their potential
to act as a "criminogenic force" and to prolong the marginalisation of ex-
offenders. It will also highlight the historical conditions in which the law
on disclosure emerged in the mid-1700s and question whether it remains
appropriate in the 21st century.
In recent years attempts have been made to facilitate the re-integration
into society of disadvantaged and marginalised groups." A number of
government strategies and initiatives that are directed towards achieving
this goal can be identified. Thus, the National Development Plan (2000-
2006) observes that:
research into the causal factors of crime conclusively demonstrates
that offenders ... generally come from the most disadvantaged
backgrounds in society and, typically, that they are unemployed,
unqualified, addicted and likely to re-offend. The label of having
been in prison becomes a further layer of disadvantage in the
community. Offenders ... experience multiple disadvantages which
accumulates leading to economic and social exclusion and to an
extreme form of marginalisation from the labour market."
42. Some amelioration has already occurred in respect of persons under 18. S. 258 of
the Children Act 200 I, provides that where such a person has been found guilty of
an offence (and it is an offence not required to be tried before the Central Criminal
Court), and a period of three years has elapsed since the finding of guilt (and the
person has not been dealt with for any other offence in the three year period), he or
she shall be treated "for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or
been charged with or prosecuted for or found guilty of or dealt with for the offence
or offences which are the subject of the finding of guilt."
43. See 1. O'Donnell, "The Re-Integration of Prisoners" (2002) 50(2) Administration
80; 1. Bacik and M. O'Connell, eds., Crime and Poverty in Ireland, (Dublin, 1998).
44. National Development Plan, 2000-2006 (PN 7780) (Dublin, 1999), p. 194
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Similarly, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.P the
Department of Trade, Enterprise and Employment.t" and the Department
of Education and Science" all point to the issue of exclusion experienced
by many offenders and the need to counteract such inequality." More
particularly, the National Economic and ..Social Forum recently
recommended that legislative changes should be introduced to allow for
the criminal records of adults to be expunged after a period of time (which
would be dependent upon the seriousness of the offence, the length of time
since the offence and the lack of offences in the interim period) and that
the Employment Equality Act, 1998 should be amended to include
protection against discrimination on the grounds of a criminal record." At
present the law relating to the duty to disclose previous criminal information
in insurance law is out of step with these initiatives. It is submitted that
45. See Department of Justice, Tackling Crime (Dublin, 1997), p. 15. For examples of
re-integration initiatives, see S. Alyward, "The Irish Prison Service, past present
and future - a personal perspective" in P. O'Mahony, ed., Criminal Justice in
Ireland (Dublin, 2002), pp. 570-594; B. Vaughan, Toward a Model Penal System,
(Dublin, 2001), pp. 51-59.
46. Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Ireland sNational Action Plan,
2001 (Dublin, 2001), p. 9. On the links between unemployment and offending, see
R. Webster et al., Building Bridges to Employment for Offenders (Home Office
Research Study 226), (London, 2001).
47. A Department of Education and Science White Paper recently suggested: "[ r[esearch
has consistently shown that offenders generally come from the most marginalised
groupings in society and typically are at high risk of being unemployed, unqualified,
addicted, experiencing multiple disadvantage and finding it exceptionally difficult
to re-integrate into the labour market. .. A key priority for the education sector in
this context will be to enhance the relevance and diversity of provision within the
prison education service and to strengthen the linkages between in-prison provision
and that available for prisoners on release, in collaboration with other agencies."
Department of Education and Science, Learning For Life: White Paper on Adult
Education (PN 8840), (Dublin, 2000), pp. 175-176. See also K. Warner, "Penal
Policy and the Adult Education of Prisoners" in P. O'Mahony, op. cit., n. 45, pp.
726-745.
48. Such an analysis should not be taken to imply that the criminal justice system can
primarily be characterised by re-integrative impulses. Indeed the Irish penal system
demonstrates ome remarkably antithetical traits. On the one hand, attempts have
been made to adopt re-integrative and inciusionary strategies. On the other hand,
and existing concurrently, more exclusionary and containment orientated strategies
are also being adopted, as typified, for example, by prison expansionist policies
and the enactment of legislation such as the Sex Offenders Act 2001: see 1.
O'Donnell and E. O'Sullivan, Crime Control in Ireland: the Politics of Intolerance,
(Cork, 200 I),pp. 5-6. More generally, see P.0 'Malley, "Volatile and Contradictory
Punishment" (1999) 3(2) Theoretical Criminology 175. On the lack of a re-
integrative ethos in the Sex Offenders Act, 2001 (particularly in relation to its
provisions for notification, post-release supervision and increases in the maximum
penalties for sexual assault), see C. White, "Controlling Sex Offenders: raising
critical questions about the Sex Offenders Bill 2000" (2001) 2 IJFL 8.
49. The National Economic and Social Forum, op. cit., n. 37, p. 91.
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expungement provisions might be introduced with a view to concealing a
person's criminal past in appropriate circumstances.
In addition to creating a further tier of disadvantage, the law on the
duty to disclose previous criminal information is open to the criticism that
it may cause rather than inhibit criminal behaviour. Labelling individuals
as "ex-offenders" can have the unintended consequence of unduly pro-
longing the stigma associated with criminal conviction." In as far as it can
affect an individual's self-definition it may also work as a self-fulfilling
prophecy. 5 I The legal rules on previous criminal information in Ireland,
and the ability of insurers to rely on vague exclusionary terms such as
"moral hazard", may further contribute to such a process. The ability of the
legal framework to operate as a counterpoint to this tendency seems much
more developed at the criminal pre-trial and trial process than it does in
relation to the scope of criminalisations.F The law asymmetrically treats
suspects and accused persons on the one side and convicted persons on the
other. For example, the strict rules that apply as regards the ability of the
prosecution to cross-examine an accused as toprevious criminal convictions
in a criminal trial may be contrasted with those that apply, or more
appropriately do not apply, in relation to adults with previous criminal
information in the realm of insurance law.53
The concept of proportionality in sentencing appears to be protected in
the Constitution and is designed to prevent the infliction of excessive
punishment. 54 It operates most effectively as regards the imposition of
particular formal punishments" and ancillary formal measures (such as
50. H. Becker, Outsiders: studies in the sociology of deviance (New York, 1963); E.
Lemert, Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control (New Jersey, 1967).
51. See lR. Lilly et al, Criminological Theory: Context and Consequence (2nd ed.,
London, 1995), pp. 110-131; C. McCullagh, Crime in Ireland: A Sociological
Introduction (Cork, 1996), p. 48.
52. See L. Kurki, "International Standards for Sentencing and Punishment" in M. Tonry
and R.S. Frase, eds., Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries (Oxford, 2001),
pp. 331-378.
53. See The People (D.PP) v. John McGrail [1990] 2 IR38 at 49-50 where the relevant
provisions of the Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act, 1924 and constitutional principles
of fairness of procedure, as they relate to cross-examination, are discussed by
Hederman J
54. See State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] IR 325 at 353 per Henchy J; People (DPP)
v. WC [1994] ILRM 321 at 325 per Flood J; People (DPP) v.M[1994] 3 IR 306 at
316 per Denham J. Slight doubts still remain about its constitutional status. As
O'Malley noted: "[a]lthough the judgments in WC and M provide impressive
authority for granting constitutional status to the proportionality principle, it is
possible that the matter has never has never been fully argued before the superior
courts ... [Nonetheless], even if proportionality was held not to be mandated by the
Constitution it still has an independent existence at common law ... " T. O'Malley,
Sentencing: Law and Practice (Dublin, 2000), p. 122.
55. Albeit peripheral, this raises interesting questions about the status of post-release
supervision orders under the Sex Offenders Act 200 I. Part 5 of the Act empowers
the Court, at sentence stage, to order such supervision of offenders following their
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disqualifications, forfeitures, confiscation of assets and compensationj"
The principle of proportionality may occasionally take account ofinJormal
ancillary punishments that occur immediately before sentence'? and it often
accommodates post-conviction consequences such as the loss of a
business.f The concept of proportionality is least effective where the link
between the formal criminal punishment and the subsequent informal
ancillary measure is governed by a degree of remoteness as is the case
where a decision to refuse insurance cover on the grounds of previous
criminal information is taken. This element of remoteness, however, should
not detract from the view that informal measures often have a greater impact
on a person's "identity, career and life-chances" than formal measures. 59 If
nothing else, such considerations should make us aware of the variety of
potential control mechanisms that exist in modem society and the need to
constantly scrutinise the safeguards put inplace to counteract such devices.t"
release from prison. Though the cumulative term of the custodial sentence and the
subsequent supervision may not exceed the maximum sentence applicable for the
offence in question, s. 29(3) of the Act provides that any prison term "shall not be
less than the term the Court would have imposed if it had considered the matter
apart from the provisions of this Part." O'Malley, with characteristic acuity, notes
the following in respect of the provision: "[i]n other words, the supervision element
may not influence the decision on the amount of primary punishment to be imposed
when the primary punishment is imprisonment. .. [I]s the supervision element to be
treated as a penalty or punishment? It flows directly from the conviction and, while
it may be defended in the interests of public safety, it certainly imposes some
restrictions on the offender's liberty after release from prison. It is, therefore, a
type of collateral hardship." T. O'Malley, "Principles of Sentencing: some recent
developments" (2001) 1(1) Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 50 at 55-56.
56. See, for example, Cox v. Ireland [1992] IR 503. See also The People (DPP) v.
Redmond, Court of Criminal Appeal, December 21, 2000, at p. 24 per Hardiman J.
57. This could include, for example, a "punishment beating" of the accused before
trial. See The People (DPP) v Hamilton, Court of Criminal Appeal, January 25,
1999, at p. 2 where Lynch J noted: "[t]he Court takes into account the fact that the
applicant in this case was beaten up by vigilante citizens ... He has been rightly held
up to opprobrium ... but on a basis which is rather excessive and in the circumstances
... the Court will reduce the sentence."
58. See The People (DPP) v. Z., Court of Criminal Appeal, March 141995, at pp. 17-
18 where the Court granted a reduction in sentence to a sex offender, noting that he
had lost his livelihood as a result of his conviction. As O'Flaherty J noted: "[w]hile
we are obliged to impose a sentence that is commensurate with the crime we must
also hold out some possibility of hope and redemption for this applicant. .. He has
suffered grievously. He has lost his business and, therefore, his livelihood. His was
not the type of business that others could look after for a time in his absence. Itwas
totally dependent on him." See also The People (DPP) v. Brophy [1992] ILRM
709 at 721 per 0 'Flaherty J.
59. S. Scheerer and H. Hess "Social control: a defence and reformulation" in R. Bergalli
and C. Surnner, eds., Social Control and the Political Order: European Perspectives
at the End of the Century, (London, 1999) p. lB. See also T. O'Malley, Sentencing
Law and Practice (Dublin, 2000) p. 194.
60. See C. Shearing, "Punishment and the Changing Face of the Governance" (2001)
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More particularly, a review of the current state of the law can bring attention
to the fact that the doubts surrounding the protections of ex-offenders may
have the unintended consequence of prolonging the effects of labelling.
Finally, in seeking compelling reasons for reform of the duty to disclose
previous criminal information, one should not ignore contextual issues
regarding the historical conditions in which the law on the duty of disclosure
emerged. The rules developed out of the social and commercial conditions
prevailing in mid-eighteenth century merchants' practices at Lloyds of
London and the need to protect the emerging insurance market. Given the
formidable communication and travel difficulties that were faced in those
days, often the most effective way to determine the risk to be covered was
to demand full disclosure on the part of the assured." Principles of utmost
good faith and the drastic remedy of avoidance for non-disclosure were,
accordingly, commensurate with the prevailing social, commercial and
geographical conditions. 62 The fact that the principle and the remedy remain
Closely tethered today with conditions that existed in the mid-eighteenth
century appears anachronistic and untenable." especially given the
resources now available to insurers.P" detailed statistical data, complex
actuarial analyses and loss-forecasting techniques, elaborate investigative
practices, the pooling of risks and comprehensive proposal forms have all
reduced the lack of parity between insurers and assureds" This continuity
in the rules of disclosure from the mid-eighteenth century, operating
independently of broader changes in the commercial and social world, has
had the paradoxical effect of tipping the balance in favour of the insurer, a
development that has been strongly criticised by comrnentators.P'' It is
3(2) Punishment and Society 203; J. Simon, "Governing through Crime" in L.
Friedman and G. Fisher, eds., The Crime Conundrum: essays on criminal justice
(New York, 1997), pp. 172-189; M. Feeley and J. Simon, "The New Penology:
notes on the emerging strategy of corrections and its implications" (1992) 4
Criminology 449; P. O'Malley, "Risk, Power and Crime Prevention" (1992) 21
Economy and Society 252.
61. See Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1909 per Lord Mansfield.
62. See P Latimer, "A Historical Perspective of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts"
(1980) 54 Law Institute Journal 484.
63. See R.W. Gordon, "Foreword: the arrival of critical historicism" (1997) 49 Stan
LR 1023 at 1024; R.W. Gordon, "Historicism in Legal Scholarship" (1981) 90
Yale LJ, 1017; K.l. Smith and l.P.S. McLaren, "History'S Living Legacy: an outline
of 'modern' historiography of the common law" (2001) 21 LS 251 at 311-317.
64. By comparison, the assureds" position has remained relatively static, particularly
as regards the obligations the duty imposes on them. As Clarke noted: "[i]t is not
obvious to the consumer why, ifhe sells a car, he is not obliged to promise anything
at all about the car but, if he insures the same car, he effectively guarantees all
manner of things to the insurer." M. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, (2nd
ed., London, 1994), p. 55. For attempts to address this situation, see supra., n. 36.
65. A.A. Tarr and l.A. Tarr, "The Insured's non-disclosure in the formation of insurance
contracts: a comparative perspective" (2001) 50 ICLQ 577 at 578.
66. YH. Ying, "Common Law Materiality - an Australian alternative" (1990) JBL 97
at 109; H.Y Yeo, "Of reciprocity and remedies - duty of disclosure in insurance
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submitted that the enactment of expungement provisions for ex-offenders
is wholly appropriate and reasonable when construed against a backdrop
of these considerations.
CONCLUSION
A number of reforms were suggested including the need to impose an
obligation on insurers to establish a nexus between the previous criminal
information of assureds and the risk posed. There is also a need for the
judiciary to further define the contours of the duty particularly as regards
arrest, charge and committal for trial, the legal standing of criminal associates
of the proposer and the test of materiality to be applied in such
circumstances. In particular, the introduction of expungement provisions,
and the possible re-examination of the grounds of discrimination under the
Employment Equality Act, 1998 and the Equal Status Act, 2000 with a
view to including ex-offenders, is desirable. The need for such reform seems
unquestionable. Whether this course of action is adopted remains a matter
of conjecture, particularly given the "culture of severity,,67 that currently
exists and the lack of significant interest groups available to carry the fight
to the powerful insurance lobby.68 In seeking to end on a less despondent
note, however, the success achieved in placing expungement provisions
for young offenders on a statutory footing can act as an emboldening
reference point for those endeavouring to effect similar change in the adult
realm.
contracts" (1991) 11 LS 131 at 153; see also R.A. Hasson, "Good Faith in Contract
Law - some lessons for insurance law" (1987) 13 Can Bus LJ 93
67. See I.O'Donnell and E O'Sullivan, op. cit., fn. 48; I.O'Donnell, "Challenging the
Punitive Obsession" (1998) 8 ICLJ 51; J. Pratt "Towards the Decivilising of
Punishment" (1998) 7(4) Journal of Social and Legal Studies 487. See also D.
Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society
(Oxford, 200 I), pp. 180-18l.
68. See C.McCullagh, "The Social Analysis of the Irish Prison System" in P.O'Mahony,
ed.,op. cit., n. 45, p. 612.
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